There is an anomaly in our constitutional law. While we protect expression once it has come to the fore, our law is indifferent to creating opportunities for expression. Our constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception of free expressioD, a belief that the stmarketplace of ideas" is freely accessible. But if ever there were a self-operating marke@lace of ideas, it has long ceased to exist. The mass media's development of an antipathy to ideas requires legal intervention if novel and unpopular ideas are to be assured a forum-unorthodox points of view which have no claim on broadcast time and uewspaper space as a matter of right are in poor position to compete with those aired as a matter of grace.
The free expression questions which now come before the courts involve individuals who have managed to speak or write in a manner that captures public attention and provokes legal reprisal. The conventional constitutional issue is whetler expression already uttered should be given first amendment shelter or whetler it may be subjected to sanction as speech beyond the constitutionally protected pa1e. To those who can obtain access to the media of mass communications first amendment case law furnishes considerable help. But what of ttrose whose ideas are too unacceptable to secure access to tbe media? To ttrem ttre 164z EARVARD LAW REVIEW [VoL 8o:164r mass communications industry replies: The first amendment guarantees our freedom to do as we choose with our media. Thus the constitutional imperative of free expression becomes a" rLtionale for repressing competing ideas. First amendment theory must be reexamined, for only by responding to tle present reality of the mass media's repression of ideas can the constitutional guarantee of free speech best serve its original purposes.
I. Tso RolreNrrc Vrew oF TEE Fnsr AlapNpNreNr: A Rarrouar-E FoR RBpnrssroN
The problem of access to the press is not a new one. 'When ttre
Newspaper Guild was organizing in the late r93ots, a statement opposing that organization \Mas prepared by the American Newspaper Publishers Association. Not surprisingly that statement ryas given publicity in almost all ttre newspapers in the United States. Mr. Heywood Broun, a celebrated American journalist, prepared a two hundred word reply for the Guild organizers and asked the hostile newspapers to print it: 1 "A very large number of newspaper owners who had beaten their breasts as evidence of their devotion to a'free press'promptly ttrrew the Guild statement iuto tle waste basket and printed not a line of it." Mr. Broun's experience illustrates tle danger posed by the ability of mass communications media to suppress information, but an essentially romantic view of the first amendment has perpetuated tle lack of legal interest in tle availability to various interest groups of access to means of communication. Symptomatic of this view is Mr. Justice Douglas's eloquent dissent in Denni,s a. United, States:2 When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion e4)oses tle false and they gain few adherents. FulI and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our owu prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free discussion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and strains tlat work to tear all civilizations apart.
Full, and. lree disansion has ind,eed. been the first article ol our laith.
The assumption apparent in this excerpt is that, without government intervention, there is a free market mechanism for ideas. Justice Douglas's position expresses tle faith that, if government r Broun, Those Chartning People, in Orse Hrnronro Ynans or rae Nerrox r97, r99 (8. Chrislman ed. rg6S).
2 34r U.S. 49$ 584 (r95r) (emphasis added).
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can be kept away from t(ideas,,, the self-operating and selfcorrecting force of "full and free discussion" wiU go about its eternal task of keeping us from "embracing what is cheap and false" to the end that victory will go to ttre doctrine which is tttrue to our genius." s This romantic view of the first amendment had its origin in Mr. Justice Holmes's free spee& opinionsl a gpical statement of his "marketplace of ideas" theory is found in his disseut in Abrams u. United, States: a But when men bave realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, ttrey may come to believe even more thau they believe the very foundatious of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas -that the best test . of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of tle market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
It is interesting, perhaps anomalous, that ttre same Justice who reminded his bretlren in Lochncr a. New York 6 ttrat the Constitution was uot ('intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or ot laissez taire," neverttreless rather uncritically accepted the view that constitutional status should be given to a free market tbeory in the realm of ideas. The possibility of governmental repression is present so long as government endures, and the first amendment has served a:; au effective device to protect the flow of ideas from governmental censorship: "Happily government censorship has put down few roots in this country. . . . We have in ttre United States no counterpart of the Lord Chamberlain who is censor over England's stage." 6 But this is to place laurels before a'phantomour constitutional law has been singularly indifferent to tle reality and implications of nongovernmental obstructions to the spread. of political truttr. This indifference becomes critical when a comparatively few private hands are in a position to determine not only the content of information but its very availability, when tle soap box yields to radio and the political pamphlet to the monopoly newspaper.
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Ossracr,Bs To AccEss: Tsn Crrer.rcrr.rc TncsNorocy oF Ttsr ComcuNrcATroNs pRocgss
The British M.P. and publicist, R.H.S. Crossman, has observed tlat the modern world is witnessing at present a ?olitical Revolu-'tion ab searing and as consequential as the rndustrial Revolution, a revolution which t'has concentrated coercive power and thought control in a few hands." 7 Power, he contends, has shifted from those who control the t'ineans of productiont, to ,,those who control the media of mass communicadon and the means to destruction (propaganda and the armed forces).r'8 Mr. Crossman, to be sure, writes from the vantage point of ttre British Labor Party, but his observations have tle ring of urgenry and contemporaneity. Difficulties in securing access, unknown both to tle draftsmen of the first amendment and to tle early proponents of its "mbrkeqilace" interpretation, have been wrought by the changing technolory of mass media. ' Mr. Broun)s e4perience as representative of the Newspaper 'Guild in tle r93o's led him to write an article in which he ex-'pressed concern about ttre implications of the newspapers' refusal to print his reply at a time when " [e] very day brings the news that '6ne'or two or three more papers have collapsed or combined witl 'tleir rivals." 0 lfe has proved a good prophet, for where fourteen English language dailies were published in New York City in r9oo, only two morning papers and two afternoon dailies survive. Many American cities have become one newspaper towns. This is a "disquietingt' development for American journalist J. Russell .Wiggins since (([t] his poncompetitive situation puts it within the power of the monopoly newspairer to suppress facts at its discretion. . . ."19 . Mr. TViggrns suggests tbat tle economics of newspaper pubtR-E.S. Cnossuerv, Tss Porrfics or Socur,rslc C4 (rS6S). eBroun, anpra note r, at tgl'. toJR. Wiconrs, Fnreoou on SEcnrc:r r? 8 (r'ev. ed. 1964) . Wiggins ofiers these statistics on ttre dimini5lisg.sompetitive character of the Amehcan press: The number of daily lewspapers in'the united states declined from zzoz in r9o9-ro_to-.r?6-o-in rgsg-+. The number of cities with compeling daily newspapers declined from 689 to only 8?. The number cif cities-with-noD-comDetlng -{ailies increased Jrofo 5ra to 13_6r. Eighteen states are now without iny Iocally competing daily newspapers. 7d. at 47, But Mr. wigeins cautions tlat the danger of suppressirg varied viewpoints as a result of &e rise of ttre mouopgly newspaper can be exaggerated since newspapers compete not only with each-other but with other media.
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ACCESS TO TEE PRESS r645 lication -rising costs of everything from newsprint to labormay be a more significant cause of ttre withlrolding of news tlan conspiratorial efforts of publishers. Less sympathetic to the mass media in evaluating the practical obstacles which confront the group seeking an adequate forum for its opinion is Marshall Mcluhan's view that ttre very nature of modern media is at war with a point of view orientation.ll Mcluhan observes that each medium engenders quite different degrees of participation. The new modes of communication engage us by their form ratler than by their content; what captivates us is tle television screen itself. rn his view the electronic media which have eclipsed the typographical age entail a high degree of nonintellectual and emotional participation and involvement.lz trVe have become mesmerized by the new forms of communication to tle point of indifference to their content and to the content of the older media. The electronic media which dominate modern communications are, in Mcl,uhan's analysis, ill suited to the problem of making public issues meaningful.
Anottrer commentator on conrmunications, Dan Lacy, has explained this indifference to content somewhat differently. More critical tban popular obsession with the forms of technological advance is ttre dull emphasis on majoritarian values which characterizes all our media, old and new: 1s
We have seen that the very technology of films and especially of broadcasting is su& that their efficiency can be realized onry when tley are reaching very large audiences. This is a constant factor that is just as present in the BBC as in the advertisingsupported networks of the United States. This te&nological fact predisposes all the mass media to conform to an already widely accepted taste. It also makes it very difficult for a novel point of view or a just emerging problem to gain access to network broadcasts or other mass components of the mass communications system. Let me make it clear once more that I qm not talking " I uanw, Ulroensrexonlc MsDrA Gg6q) . 12 IiI. aL r73. Tbe first ameudment implications of 'his phenoneDon are very great indeed. rn the supreme Court decisioDs we fiud a tleory of knowledge whi& revolves around an outmoded conception of decision p3tring: Information is distributed by advocates of various points of vierv and, after assimilation and refl.ection, the citizen makes his judglaent. But, according to Mcr.uhan, the med.ia defeat this step-ladder approach to decision making: ..As the speed of iaformation increases, the tendeucy is for politics to move away from representation and delegation of constitueuts toward immediate involvement of the entire coumunity in the central acts of decision. The aversion of the media for ttre novel and heretical has escaped attention for an odd reason. The controllers of tle media have no ideology. Since in the main they espouse no particular ideas, ttreir antipathy to all ideas has passed unnoticed.la What has happened is not that the controllers of opinion, Machiavellian fashion, are subtly feeding us information to ttre end tlat we shall acquiesce in their political view of the universe. On the coutrary, the communications industry is operated on the whole with an intellectual neutrality consistent with V.O. Key's tleory that tle commercial nature of mass communications makes it ,,bad business" to espouse tle heterodox or the controversial.l6 But retreat from ideology is not bereft of ideological and practical consequences. fn a commentary about television, but which applies equally well to all mass media, Gilbert Seldes has complained that, in a time demanding more active intelligence than has ever before been necessary if we are to survive, the most powerful of all our media are inducing inertia.ls The contemporary structure of tle mass media direct tle media away from rather ttran toward opinion-makiug. fn other words, it is not ttrat tle mass communication industry is pushing certain ideas and rejecting others but rather ttrat it is using the free spee& and free press guarantees to avoid opinions instead of acting ils a sounding board for their expression. TVhat happens of course is that the opinion vacuum is filled with tle least raThat f[g 6sdir bave had a crrtting edge in tle past, hovever, should not be forgotteu. on t.he phenomenon of tle political radio .'voices', of the ttrirties it bas been remarked:
There were mary opportunities in the early years for conuentators to convert listeuers to a poilt of-view. None succeided uutil the beginning of the second decade of radio, when ttre Depression made home entirtainient r"T$1toV-for most families . . . . Mer like Fattrer Charles f. Cougnn a1d r{u_ey-Lo-ng could start a movement to bring to Arnerica a Fascist biand of social justice o-r to make it possible for Americans to share the wealth. long was stopp__ed in-{93S by _a bullet in Baton Rouge, Louisiana; F"td; 9ougblin was silenced in r94o Py_hit bishop. Both hid long demonstrated borv magnetic a radio voice iould be. The failures of existing media are revealed by the development of new media to convey unorthodox, unpopular, and new ideas. Sit-ins aud demonstrations testify to the inadequacy of old media as instruments to afford full and effective hearing for all points of view. Demonstrations, it has been well said, are ,,the free press of tle movement to win justice for Negroes . . .r, \1 But, like an inadequate underground press, it is a communications medium by default, a statement of the inability to secure access to the conventional means of reaching and changing public opinion. By ttre bizarre and unsettling nature of his technique tle demonstrator hopes to arrest and divert attention long enough to compel the public to ponder his message. But attention-getting devices so abound in ttre modern world that new ones soon become tiresome. The dissenter must look for ever more unsettling assaults on the mass mind if he is to have continuing impact. Thus, as critics of protest are eager and in a sense correct to say, tle prayer-siuging student demonstration is the prelude to TVatts. But tle difficulty with this criticism is that it wishes to throttle protest rather than to recognize that protest has taken these forms because it has had nowhere else to go.
Ifr. M.qKrNc rEE Fnsr Arcxounrvr'Wonr<
The Justices of the United States Supreme Court are not innocently unaware of these contemporary social realities, but they have nevertheless failed to give the .(marketplace of ideas,t theory of the first amendment the burial it merits. Perhaps the interment of this tleory has been denied for the understandable reason ttrat tle Court is at a loss to know wittr what to supplant it. But to put off inquiry under today's circumstances will only aggravate the need for it under tomorrow's.
A. Beyond Rotnanticism There is inequality in the power to communicate ideas just as ttrere is inequality in economic bargaining power; to recognize the Iatter and deny tle former is quixotic. The t'marketplace of ideas" view has rested on the assumption tlat protecting the right t" F*ty, Mssscomrn as Eilacotorr35 Aac. Scsoren 293,3oo (rg66). of expression is equivalent to providing for it.18 But changes in the commn''ications industry have destroyed ttre equilibrium in that marketplace. While it may have been still possible in r9z5 to believe with Justice Holmes that every idea is "acted on unless some ottrer belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth," le it is impossible to believe that now. Yet the Holmesian ttreory is not abandoned, even though tle advent of radio and television has made even more evident that philosophy's unreality. A realistic view of the first amendment requires recognition that a right of e4pression is somewhat t}in if it can be exercised only at the sufferance of the managers of mass communications.
Too Iittle attention has been given to defining tle purposes which tLe first amendment protection is designed to a,ehisys and to ideutifying the addressees of that protection. An eloquent exception is the statement of Justice Brandeis in Whitney a. Cali,forni,a2o that underlying the first amendment guarantee is the assumption that free expression is indispensable to the (3dis-covery and spread of political trutl" aud tlat the (sgreatest menace to freedom is an inert people." In,Thornhill u. Alaba?ttazL
Justice Murphy described his view of the first amendment:
The exigencies of ttre colonial period and tle efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of ttrese liberties as adequate to supply the fublic need. lor inlorncation and ed.ucation with respect to the significant issues ol the times. . . . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about rvhich information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. in Whitne!, ?s was Justice Murphy in Thornhilt, of ttre constitutional recognition tlat is given to the necessity of inhibiting "the occasional t5nannies of governing majorities" from throttling opportunities for discussion. But is it such a large constitutional step to take tle same approach to nongoverning minorities who control the machinery of communicatiou? rs it too bold to suggest tlat it is necessary to ensure access to tle mass media for unorthodox ideas in order to make effective the guarantee against repression? Another conventionally stated goal of first amendment protection -tle ttpublic order function" -also cries out for recognition of a right of access to the mass media. The relationship between constitutional assurance of an opportuuity to communicate ideas and the integrity of the public order TviLS appreciated by both Justice Cardozo and Justice Brandeis. Tn Palko l. connecticut2z Justice cardozo clearly indicated that while many rights could be eliminated and yet (tjusticett not undone, ,,neittrer liberty nor justice would exist . . . [without] freedom of thought and speechtt since free expression is "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.,, If freedom of expression cannot be secured because entry into the communication media is not free but is confined as a matter of discretion by a few private hands, tbe sense of the justice of existing institutions, rvhich freedom of arpression is designed to assure, vanishes from some section of our population as surely as if access to the media were restricted by the government.
Justice Brandeis, in his seminal opinion in Whitney -one of the few efforts of a Supreme Court Justice to go beyond tle banality of tle '(marketplace of ideas" -also stressed the intimary of the relationship between the goals of a respect for public order and the ixsurance of free expression. For Brandeis one of the assumptions implicit in the guarantee of free expression is ttrat "it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imaginationl that fear breeds rept'ession; that repression breeds hatel tlat hate menaces stable governmentl that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies . . . .)t 23 r wor.rld suggest tlat the 223o2 US. 3rg, s2S-27 (rSsZ). 2s474 us.3sz,3zs Gszil. chief Justice Eiughes made a similar reference to the connection between free speeih and public order iu De Jonge v. oregon, 299 U.S. gS3, S6S (rg3t):
The greate-r the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions biy force and viofence, tnu noie r650 EARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8o:164r contemporary challenge to this 3'path of safety'r has roots in ttre Iack of opportunity for the disadvantaged and the dissatisfied of our society to discuss supposed grievances effectively.
The "sit-in" demonstrates that the safety valve value of free expression iu preserving public order is lost when access to tle communication media is foreclosed to dissident groups. It is a measure of the jaded and warped standards of the media tlat ideas which normally would never be granted a forum are given serious network coverage if they become sufficiently enmeshed in mass demonstration or riot and violence. fdeas are denied admission into media until they are first disseminated in a way that challenges and disrupts the social order. They then may be discussed and given notice. But is it not the assumption of a constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression ttrat ttr" pto.rru ought to work just the other way-tlat the idea be given currency first so that its proponents will not conclude that unrest and violence alone will suffice to capture public attention? Contemporary constitutional theory has been indifferent to this task of channeling the novel and the heretical into tle mass communications media, perhaps because ttre problem is indeed a recent one.
B. The Need lor a Contextual Approach
A corollary of the romantic view of tle first amendment is ttre Court's unquestioned assumption ttrat ttre amendment affords ttequal" protection to the various media. According to tlis view new media of communication are assimilated into first amendment analysis without regard to the enormous differences in impact ttrese media have in comparison with the traditiond printed word. Radio and television are to be as free as newspapers and magazines, sound trucks as free as radio and television.
This extension of a simplistic egalitarianism to media whose imperative is the need tg preserve -inviolate ttre coustitutioual rigbts of free speech, free. press -and free asseTrbly in _order to maintain tbe -opportunity for.free p-glitjra! dhcussion, t9 ghe end that government may be -responsive
. to tbe will of the people and tbat changes, if desired, may be obtaiired by peaceful meaDs.
Elorvever, although all Justices rvould probably agree that there is a public order function underlying the free expresion guarantee, others have pointed out that the guarantee contemplates a measure of disorder as well. Thus Justice Douglas dedared for the Court in Terminiello v. Chicago, 33? U.S. r, 4 (1949):
Accordi.ngly a function of free speech under our systen of government is to invite dispute. fu may indeed beit serve its high purpose wnei it induces a co.udition-of unrest, creates dissaGfaction with conditiois as they are, or evel stirs people to anger. rs6IJ ACCESS TO TEE PRESS r65r comparative impacts are gravely disproportionate is wholly unrealistic. It results from confusing freedom of media content with freedom of ttre media to restrict access. The assumption in romantic first amendment analysis that the same postulates appty to different classes of people, situations, ild means of communication obscures tle fact, noted explicitly by Justice Jackson in Kouacs a. cooperr2{ that problems of access and impact vary significantly from medium to medium: "The moving picture screen, tle radio, the newspaper, ttre handbill, the sound truck and ttre street corner orator have differing natures, values, abrrses and dangers. Ea&, in my view, is a law unto itself, and all we are dealing with now is ttre souud truck.', However, tlis enlightened view, suggesting t.he creation of legal principles which fit the dimensions of the particurar medium, was probably not accepted by the majority in Roaacs and appeared to be rejected by the dissenters. For the court Justice Reed declared ttrat tle right of free speeci is guaranteed each citizen that he may reacb ttre minds of willing listeners, and to do so there must be opportunity to win tleir attention. This statement would have had tremendous impact had Justice Reed meant ttrat the free spee& guarantee applied with particular force to ttrose media where the greatest public attention was focused. But what he probably meant was ttrat because some media, albeit ttre most important ones, are closed, it is important ttrat, other means of communication remain more or less unregulated.
The dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Black, are explicit in rejecting any attempt to shape legal principles to ttre particular medium, reasoning ttrat government cannot restrain a given mode of communication because that would disadvantage the othersttfavoritism" would result because tt [l] aws which hamper tre free use of some instruments of communication tlereby favor competing channels." 26 Justice Black,s theory appears to be that if all instrumentalities of communication are t(free" in the sense of immunization from governmental regulations, probrems of access will work tlemselves out. But what happens in fact is tlat the dominant media become even more influential and tle media which are freely available, such as sound trucks and pamphlets, become even less significant. Thus, we are presented with ttre anomaly tlat the protagonist of the ttabsolute" view of free 165z EARVARD LAW REVIBW [Vol. 8o:164r spee& has helped to fashion a protective doctrine of greatest utility to tle owners and operators of the mass communications industry. By refusing to treat media according to their peculiar natures Justice Black has done that very thing he so heartily condemns-he has favored some channels of commuuication. ' Justice Black is not unaware of the inequality in the existing operation of ttre mass media, but he blurs distinctions among ttre media and acquiesces in tleir differing impacts: 20
Yet everybody knows the vast reaches of these powerfur chanrrels of communication which from the very nature of our economic system must be under the control aad guidance of comparatively fewpeople. . . .
. . . For the press, ttre radio, and the moving picture owners have tleir favorites, and it assumes the impossible to suppose that these agencies will at all times be equally fair as between the candidates and officials they favor and those whom they vigorously oppose.
For all the intensity of his belief that '(it is of particular importance" in a system of representative government that tle'(fullest opportunity be afforded candidates', to e4)ress tleir views to the votersr2? Justice Black is nevertheless of the opinion that courts must remain constitutionally insensitive to the problem of getting ideas before a forum. That his approach affords greatest protection to mass media does not come about because of a belief that such protection is particularly desirable. Rather it results from a constitutional approach which looks only to protecting tle co--unications which are presently being made witlout inquiry as to whether freedom of speech aud press, in defense of which so much judicial rhetoric is expended, is a realistically available right. while we have taken measures to ensure the sanctity of that which is said, we have not inquired whether, as a practical matter, the difficulty of access to the media of communication has made tle right of expression somewhat myttrical.
Once again Justice Jackson was the auttror of one of tle few judicial statements which recognizes that first amendment interpretation is uselessly conceptual unless it attempts to be responsive to ttre diverse natures of differing modes of communication. Dissenting in Runz a. New York2' he thought absolutist interpretations of the first amendment too simplistic and suggested, that the susceptibility to public control of a given medium of rg67f ICCESS TO TEE PRESS 16ss communication should be in direct proportion to its public impact: r'Few are the riots caused by publication alone, few are the mobs that have not had tleir immediate origin in harangue. Th.e oalnerabikty ol aarious lorms ol communication to comrnunity control nt'ust be proportioned to their impact upon other community interestsJ' Although originally made in a context of tle greater Iikelihood that a riot would be initiated by an harangue than by a newspaper publication, ttre principle applies equally well to the impact which the new technology has on the informational and public-order goah of the first amendment.
An analysis of the first amendment must be tailored to the context in which ideas are or seek to be aired. This contextual approach requires an examination of the purposes served by and tle impact of each particular medium. If a group seeking to present a particular side of a public issue is unable to get space in the only newspaper in town, is this inability compensated by the availability of the public park or tle sound truck? Competitive media only constitute alternative means of access in a crude manner. rf ideas are criticized in one forum the most adequate response is in the same forum since it is most likely to reach the same audience. Furtl,er, tle various media serve different functions and create different reactions and expectations -criticism of an individual or a governmental policy over television may reach more people but criticism in print is more durable.
The test of a community's opportunities for free expression rests not so much in an abundance of alternative media but rather in an abundance of opportunities to secure expression in media with the largest impact. such a test embodies Justice Jackson's observation that community control must be in proportiou to tbe impact which a particular medium has on the communitv.
C. A New Perspective
The late Professor Meiklejohn, who has articulated a view of the first amendment which a^ssumes its justification to be political selfgovernment, has wisely pointed out that "what is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said" -that the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers but the minds of the hearers.2e can everything worth saying be effectively said? constitutional opin- ions that are particularly solicitous of the interests of mass media -radio, television, and mass circulation newspaper-devote Iittle thought to the difficulties of securing access to those media. rf those media are unavailable, can the minds of "hearers, be reached effectively? creating opportunities for expression is as important as ensuring the right to express ideas without fear of governmental reprisal. The problem of private restrictions on freedom of expression might, iu special circumstances, be attacked under the federal antitrust laws.8' Tn Associated Press a. united, states,st involving an attempt to exclude from membership competitors of existing members of the Associated Press in order to deprive tlem of the use of the AP's wire service, Justice Black wrote for the court that nongovernmental combinations are not immune from governmental sanction if they impede rattrer than expedite free expression:
lThe Firstf Atnendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dhsemination ol information lrorn diaerse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wel.lare ol the fubtic, thdt a lree press is a condition ol a lree society. surely a command ttrat the government itself shall not impede ttre free flow of ideas does not afford non-govemmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. . . . Freedom to ?ublish is guaranteed. by the constitution, but lreedon to combine to keep others lrorn publi.sh.i.ng is not. Freedom of the press lrom gooern nental interJerence under the First amend,tnent does not sanction repression oJ that lreeilom by priaate interests.
Despite tlese unusual remarks tlis opinion reflects a romantic view of tle first amendment, for Justice Black zxsumes tle (,free flow of ideas" and the "freedom to publish, absent a combination of publishers. Moreover, this was an unusual case; antitrust law operates too indirectly in assuring access to be an effective device.
But the case is important in its acknowledgment tlat ttre public interest, here embodied in tle antitrust statutesr @D override tle first amendment claims of ttre mass media; it would, seem tlat the public interest in e4pression of divergent viewpoints should be weighted as heavily when the mass media invoke the first amendment to shield restrictions on access. rn tle opinion for ttre trial court, Judge Learned Hand at least suggests first amendment protection for tle interest which the individual mem- our constitutional theory, particularly in the free speech area, has historically been inoperative unless government restraint can be shown. If the courts or the legislature were to guarantee some minimal right to access for ideas which could not ottrerwise be effectively aired before the public, tlere would be '(state action" sa srrfFsisal to support a claim by the medium involved that ttris violated its first amendment rights. However, tle right of free expression is not an absolute right, as is illustrated by Associated Pressrand to guarantee access to divergent, ottrerwise unexpressed ideas would so promote the societal interests under\ring the first amendment as perhaps to outweigh the mediumts claim. Nor is the notion of assuring access or opportunity for discussion a novel ttreory. Tn Near a. Minnesota errel. Olson 3a Chief Justice Hughes turned to Blackstone to corroborate the view that freedom from prior restraint ratber than freedom from subsequent punishment was central to ttre eighteenth century notion of liberty of ttre press. This concern with suppression before dissemination wiu doubtless to assure that ideas would reach ttre public. 36 K . Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, misdrievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.r D
The avowed emphasis of free speech is still on a freemants right to '(lay what sentiments he pleases before the public.,, But Blackstone wrote in another age. Today ideas reach the millions largely to the extent they are permitted entry iuto the great [VoI.8o:164r metropolitan dailies, news magazines, and broadcasting networks. The soap box is'no longer an adequate forum for public discussion. only the new media of communication can lay sentiments before the public, and it is they rattrer than government who can most effectively abridge expression by nuilifying tle opportunity for an idea to win acceptance. As a constitutional ttreory for tne communication of ideas, laissez faire is manifestly irrelevant.
The constitutional admonition against abridgment of speech and press is at present not applied to the very interests which have real power to effect such abridgment. rndeed, nongoverning minorities in control of the means of communication should perhaps be inhibited from restraining free speech (by the denial of access to their media) even more ttran governing majorities are restrained by the first amendment-minorities do not have the mandate which a legislative majority enjoys in a pority operating under a tleory of representative government. what is required is an interpretation of the first amendment which focuses on tle idea that restraining the hand of government is quite useless in assuring free speech if a restraint on access is effectively secured by private groups. A constitutional prohibition against governmental restrictions on expression is effective only if the Constitution ensures an adequate opportunity for discussion. since ttris opportunity exists only in the mass media, the interests of those who control tle means of communication must be accommodated with the interests of tlose who seek a forum in which to express tleir point of view. The potential of existing law to support recognition of a right of access has gone largely unnoticed by the supreme court. Judicial blindness to the problem of securing access to the press is dramatically illustrated by New York ri.mes co. zt. sulli.aan,ss one of the latest chapters in the romantic and rigid interpretation of tbe first amendment. There the court reversed a five hundred ttrousand dollar judgment of civil libel which Montgomery commissioner sullivan had won against the Tirnes in the Alabama state courts. The Court created the *iime.s privilege,, whereby a defamed "public official'l is constitutionally proscribed from '.967f
.ACCESS TO TEE PRESS r657 recovering damages from a newspaper unless he cah show tbat tle offending false publication was made with ('actual malice.', The constitutional armor which ri.mes now offers newspapers is predicated on the "principle tlat debate on pubric issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and, that it may well indudevehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.t'37 But it is paradoxical that although ttre libel laws have been emasculated for the benefit of defendant newspapers where the plaintiff is a ttpublic official,D aa ttre court shows no corresponding concern as to whether debate will in fact be assured. The irony of Ti,rnes and its progeny lies in t}e unexanrined assumption that reducing newspaper exposure to libel litigation will remove restraints on expression and, Iead to an (tinformed society." But in fact the decision creates a new imbalauce in the communications process. purporting to deepen the constitutional guarantee of full expression, tle actual effect of the decision is to perpetuate the freedom of a few in a manner adverse to the public interest in uninhibited debate. unless tbe Titnes doctrine is deepened to require opportrrnities for ttre public figure to reply to a defamatory attack, the Ti.mes decisiori will merely serve to equip the press with some new and rather hear5r artillery which can crush as well as stimulate debate.se 3r Id. al z7o. 38This protectiou bestowed on the presr may sxtend far beyond that suggested by tbe "public offcial" language of. Tines. Expansion has already beeu niie by the supreme court. Garrison v. Louisiana, g?9 us. 6+ (rg6+) (criticisn ;f "pdvate" bebavior whi& reflects on judge's fitness for ofiEce L protected by Tines); Rosenblatt v. Baer, s8g u.s. ls (rg66) (locar nonelected official may te a "public oftcial"). Lower court cases have begun further ertensions. Tbe Tines privilege Eay cortre to bar recovery by a private inttividual who is .,incidentaUyt defamed by a miticism directed at a public official. see Gilberg v. Goffi, zr App. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Times, ioined in by Justice Douglas, is perhaps even more disappointing than thl opinion of the court in its failure to recognize the balancing problems created by the changing nature of the communications process. once again Justice Black iusisted tlat newspapers be entirely immune from libel actions where public officials are being attacked, and once again his absolutist rhetoric obscured fundamental problems. He seems to identify the (.press,, wittr the "people" and to think that immunity from suit for newspapers is equivalent to enhancing tle right of free e4pression for all members of the community: ao . . . I doubt that a countr5r can live in freedom where its people ca'' be made to suffer physically or financially for criticizing treir government, its actions, or its officials. . . . An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what r consider to be tbe miuimumguarantee of the FirstAmendment.
The law of libel is not the only threat to first a.urendment values; problems of equal moment are raised by judicial inattention to the fact that tle newspaper publisher is not the ontry addressee of first amendment protection. supreme Court efforts to remove the press from judicial as weu as legislative control do not necessarily stirnulate and prqserve that "multitude of tonguest, on which "we have staked . . . our aU." 41 What tbe Court has done is to magnify the power of one of ttre participants in the communications process wittr apparently no tlought of imposing oD newspapers concomitant responsibilities to assure &at t.he new protection will actually enlarge and protect opportrrnities for expression.
rf financial immunization by the supreme court is necessary to ensure a courageous press, the public officials who fall prey to such judicially reinforced lions should at least have the right to respond or to demand retraction in tle pages of the newspapers which have published charges against them. The opportunity for counterattack ought to be at ttre very heart of a constitutional theory which supposedly is concerned with providing an outlet for individuals "who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even By severely undercutting a public official's ability to recover danrages when he has been defamed, the Times decision would seern to reduce the likelihood of retractions since the normal mitigation incentive to retract will be absent. For example, tle Times failed to print a retraction as requested by sullivan even tlough an Alabama statute provided that a retraction eliminates the jury's ability to award punitive damages. on tle ottrer hand, Times was a special case and the court explicitly left open the question of a public official's ability to recover damages if tlere were a refusal to retract: aB Whettrer or not a tailure to retract may ever constitute su& evidence [of ('actual malice"], there are two reasons why it does not here. First, the letter written by the Times reflected a reasonable doubt on its part as to whether ttre advertisement could reasonably be taken to refer to respondent at all. Second, it was not a final refusal, since it asked for an explanation on this pointa request tlat respondent chose to ignore.
Although the Court did uot foreclose the possibility of allowing public officials to recover damages for a newspaper's refusal to retract, its failure to impose such a responsibility represents a lost opportunity to work out a more relevant theory of the first amendment. similarly, the courtts failure to require newspapers to print a public official's reply ignored a device which could furttrer first amendment objectives by making debate meaningful and responsive.a{ Abandonment of tle romantic a2 376 U.S. at 266. 43 lil. at 286. Retraction statutes have some bearing on enforcing responsive dialogue. These statutes, common in this country, require tle publisher to .(take back" what has already been said if damages in a defamation suit are to be mitigated. U falce statemenLs have been made, and the complainant can couvince the publisher to retract on tle basis of correct information, such a procedure certainly serves a deansing function for tle information processi. f's1 3 dissrcsiqp of the status of retractions after the Tiales decGion, see Note, Vittilication ol the Reflutation ol a Publis Offcialr So l{env. L. Rev. r?3o, r?4o-43 (rS6Z).
{{ The right of reply is commonly used i:r Europe and south Anerica, constituting more tban a remedy for defamation since it is available to anyone named or designated in a publication. Tbere are esseutially two approacles to tbe right of reply, one modelled on French law, rvhictr allows ttre reply to contain a statement of the individual's point of vierv, and one on German law, whi& rinrits the reply to corrections of factual misstatements. For a tlorough study of these devices, see Donnelly, The Right ol Reply: An alternatiae to an action lor Libel, 34 vl. L. Rrv. 867 (rs+8). ff either approach were to be adopted. here, view of the first amendment wourd highlight the importance of grving constitutional status to these responsibilities of the press. However, even these devices are no substitute for the development of a general right of access to the press. A group that ls not being attacked but merery ignored will find them of little use. rndifference rather than hostility is ttre bane of new ideas and for that malaise only some device of more general applicatiou will suffice. rt is true ttrat Justice Brennan, *iitiog for ttre court in Times, did suggest that a rigorous test for libel in the public criticism area is particularly necessary where the offending publication is an "editorial advertisementr,, since ttris is an ,,important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by lersons who do not themsel,aes haae &6cess to publi,slzing faci,litiis -who wish to exercise their freedom of speech euen though they are not rnembers ol tke press." {6 This statement leaves us at t}re threshold bf the question of whetler these individuals -ttre ((nonpress)'-5foeuld have a right of access secured. by tle first amendment: should ttre newspaper have an obligation to take the editorial advertisement? As Justice Brennan appropriately noted, ne\ilspapers are an important outlet for ideas. But currenth they are outlets entry to which is granted at the pleasure of their managers. The press having been given the Times immunity to promote public debate, there seems little justification for not enforcing coordinate responsibility to ailocate space equitably among ideas competing for public attention. And, some quitl recent shlfts in constitutional doctrine may at last make feasible the articulation of a constitutionally based right of access to ttre media.
B. Ginzburg a. United States: The Implkations ol '
The "Com.mercial Etcploi,tatiorft Doctrine ' The Timesdecision operates on tle assumption that newspapers are fortresses of vigorous public criticism, ttrat assuring tre piess freedom over its content is the only prerequisite to open and robust debate. But if the rai,son ilatre of the **s -"d.ia is not to maximize discussion but to maximize profits, inquiry should the French method would appear appropriate since assur:uce of debate is the stated purpose of. Times, suggestiag tbe exchange of opinion. For a d.iscussion of right of reply after Tintes, see go llanv. L. Rav., silpre note 43, at r74S_4I. Ct. Mills v. Alabama, s8+ U.S. zr4 eg66), discussed pp. *72-fu infra. See also Pedrick, Freedom ol the Press anil the Low ol z;oeliihe aoaent ieuiseil rronsIationr4g Corumrr, L.Q.5Sr (rS6+).
{!376 U.S. at 266 (euphasis added). [A]ttention to the economic aspects of the communications industries serves to emphasize the fact that they consist of commercial enterprises, not public service institutions They sell advertising in one form or another, and they bait it principally rvith entertainment. only incidentally do they collect and disseminate political intelligence.
. . . The networks are in an unenviable economic position. They are not completely free to sell their product -air time. rf they make ttreir facilities available to those who advocate causes slightly off color politically, they may antagonize their major customers.
The press suffers from tle same pressures -((lslyspaper publishers are essentially people who sell white space on newsprint to advertisers"; {z in large part they are only processors of raw materials purchased from others.{8 Professor Key's conclusion -indifference to content follows from the structure of contemporary mass communicationscompares well with Marshall Mcrluhan's view that the nature of the communications process compels a ('strategy of neutrality.r'
For ilrcl-uhan it is the technology or form of television itself, rather than the message, which attracts public attention. Hence the media owners are anxious that media content not get enmeshed with unpopular views which will undermine the attraction which the media enjoy by virtue of tleir form alone: as Thus ttre commercial interests who think to render media universally acceptable, invariably settle for ..entertainment', as a stratery of neutrality. A more spectacular mode of tle ostrichhead-in-sarid could not be devised, for it ensures maximum pervasiveness for any medium whatever.
whether ttre mass media suffer from an instifutional distaste for controversy because of technological or of economic factors, this antipatly to novel ideas must be viewed against a background of industry insistence on constitutional immunity from legally imposed responsibilities. A quiet truth emerges from such a study: iudustry opposition to legally imposed responsibilities does rrowever, tlere is emerging in our constitutional philosophy of the first amendment a strain of realism which contrists -uircaty with the prevailing romanticism. The much publicized .uru of Gi'nzburg a. united states 50 contains the seeds of a uew pragmatic approach to the first amendment guarantee of free expression. rn Gi.nzbarg the dissemination of books was held to violate tle federal obscenity statute not because the printed, material was in itself obscene but because the publications were viewed by the court ((against a background of commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of tleir prurient appeal." sl The books were purchased by the reader '(for titillation, not for saving intellectual content."
The mass communications industry should be viewed in constitutional litigation with the same candor with which it has been analyzed by industry members and schorars in communication. rf dissemination of books can be prohibited and punished when tle dissemination is not for any "saving intellectual content,, but .for t(commercial exploitationr" it would seem that the mass communications industry, Do'Iess at'imated by motives of ,,commercia'l exploitation," could be legally obliged to host competing opinions and points of view.62 rf the mass media are essentially business enterprises and their commercial nature makes it diffrcult to glve a full and effective hearing to a wide spectrum of opinioh, a theory of ttre first amendment is unrealistic if it prevents courts or legislatures from requiring the media to do ttrat whicb for commercial reasons, they would be otherwise unIikely to do. such proposals only require that tle opportunity for publication be broadened and do not involve restraint on publication or punishment after publication, as did Ginzburg where the distributor of books was jailed under an obscenity statute even though the books themselves were not constitutionally 50383 U.S.. 463 (1966) . 6r Id. at 466. 52 The Ginzbarg ttreory tbat an overriding commerdal purpose may alter frst amendment imperatives vis-i-vis legislative power to regulate a particular area is not new doclrine. For example, the Ginzbarg court cites valentine v. chrestensen,316 u.S. 5z (rg4z), which upheld an ordinance forbidding the distribution of commercial matter iu the streets when applied to an individual who had attempted to avoid the statute by printing noncommercirt information on the opposite side of a commercial handbill.
HeinOnline --80 Harv. L. Rev. L662 Lg66_I967 rp6zl ACCESS TO TEE PRESS r663 obscene.'s rn a companion case to Ginzburg,Justice Douglas remarked tlat the vice of censorship lies in the substitution it makes of "majority rule where minority tastes or viewpoints were to be tolerated." 64 But what is suggested here is merely that legal steps be taken to provide for the airing and publication of "minority tastes or viewpointsr" not tlat the mass media be prevented from publishing their views. It Ginzburg Justice Brennan observed: 66
[T]he circums]ances of presentation and dissemination of material are equally relevant to determining whether social importance claimed for material in the courtroom was, in the circumstances, pretense or reality-whether it was the basis upon which it was traded in the marketplace or a spurious claim for litigation purposes.
The same approach should be taken in evaluating the protests of mass media against the prospect of a right to access. rs their argument -that the development of legally assured rights of access to mass communications would hinder media freedom of expression -((pretense or reality"? The usefulness of Gi.nzburg lies in its recognition of the doctrine that when commercial purposes dominate the matrix of expression seeking first amendment protection, first amendment directives must be restructured. when commercial considerations dominate, often leading tle media to repress ideas, tlese media should not be allowed to resist controls designed to promote vigorous debate and expression by cynical reliance on the first amendment.
C. Ofice ol Corumunication ol the tlnited Church ol Christ a. FCC: A Support lor the Future? There are ottrer signs of change in legal doctrine, among the more significant the recent decision in ofice of commani,cati,on ol the united church ol chri,st u. FCC.66 Tn church ol christ, individuals and orgauizations claiming to represent the Negro community of Jackson, Mississippi -forty-five percent of the city's total population -requested the FCC to grant an evidentiary hearing to challenge tle renewal application of a tele-53 "The court today appears to concede that the materials Ginzburg mailed were themselves protected by the First Amendment.', 3g3 us. at 5oo (stewart, J., dissenting). vision broadcast licensee in Jackson. The petitioners contended that the station discriminated against Negroes, both by failure to give meaningful expression to integrationist views contrary to the segregationist position taken by it and by the relatively tiny segment of religious programming assigned to Negro churctres. The commission held ttrat the petitioners were merery members of the public aud had no standing to claim a hearing since ttrere was no showing of competitive economic injury or electrical interference. rifowever, in an opinion which may be t}re harbinger of a new approach for the whole field of communications, the court of appeals reversed the commission, radicalry e:panding the grounds for standing by holding the interests of communit5r groups in broadcast programming sufEcient to obtain an evidentiary hearing on license renewal applications. The court of appeals rested its decision on ttre Fccts (tfairnesst, doctrine, an administrative creation 6? first adopted in 1949 and later codified in a rysg amendment to section 3rs of the Federal communications Act.68 The statute requires licensees ttto afford reasonable opportunity for ttre discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance,', which in operation means that where a Iicensee has taken a position he must permit spokesmen for ttre other side or sides to reply. of course, the defect of the statute is that, as interpreted, the obligation to provide access for ideas of ttpublic importance" arises only after tle Iicensee has taken a position on an issue. By avoiding controversy the ficensee can evade the fairness rule -there is no duty to report the other side of silence. Beyond this, if the licensee chooses to violate the requirements of tbe doctrine by only reporting one side of a controversS little can be done about it until liceuse renewal. Formerly not much was done even at the time of renewal since a refusal to renew is an extremety harsh penalty. I{owever, groups and individuals representing tle public now have been authorized to challenge Iicense renewal in their own right.
Church ol Christ, holding the listener's reaction to programming snfficient to furnish standing to contest license renewal, is one of the most significant cases in public law in recent years. rt is unfortunate that the constitutional basis of the case, though readily discenrible, 'was not made more explicit. The court's opinion relied on the FCC's Report on Editorializing by Broadcast 57 The doctriue was promulgated by the Fcc in its Rel,or, on Editorializing by Broodcast Licensex, rg F.C.C. rz46 (:949). 58+? US.C. $ srS(a) (rg6+).
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ACCESS TO TEE PRESS r665 Licensees, the document whi& gave 1ife to the commissionrs "fairness" doctrine. The court emphasized principally ttre primary status of "the 'right of the public to be informed, ratler than any right on the part of ttre Government, any broadcast Iicensee or atry individual member of the public to broadcast his own particular views on any matter . . . .t !r 6e This statement was accompanied in tle Report by citation to two formative first amendment cases.6o rt is noteworthy that prior to the promurgation of the Report the alleged unconstitutionality of the fairness doctrine was vigorously asserted by industry witnesses in the hearings before the commission.sl To the challenge tlat programmiug standards such as the "fairness" doctrine were violations of the first amendment, the commission made remarks which are quite pertinent to the achievement of a healthy symbiosis between the first amendment and modern mass communications media: 02
The freedom of spee& protected against goverrrmental abridgment by the first amendment does not extend any privilege to government licensees of means of public communications to exclude the expression of opinions and ideas with which they are in disagreement. We believe, on the contrary, that a requiremeut that broadcast licensees utilize their fran&ises in a rnaru.er in which tbe listeuing public may be assured of hearing varying opinions on the paramount issues facing the Americau people is within both ttre spirit and letter of the first amendment. church ol christ marks tle beginning of a judicial awareness ttrat our legal system must protect not only tle broadcaster's right to speak but also, in some measure, public rights in the communications process. Perhaps this new awareness will stimulate inquiry into the stake a newspaper's read.ership has in the content of the press. understanding that church ol christ bas a constitutional as well as statutory basis helps to expose the distinction typically made between newspapers and broadcast stations. An orthodox dictum in Judge Burger's otherwise pioneering opinion in church oJ chri,st illustrates the traditional approach: 03 5e 13 F.C.C. zl rz4g, cited in 359 F.ad at 999 n. A broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited aud valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts' that franctrise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations. A newspaper can be operated at ttre whim or caprice of its ownersl a broadcast station canuot.
But can a valid distinction be drawn between newspapers and broadcasting stations, witl only the latter subject to regulation? rt is commonly said that because the number of possible radio and television licenses is limited, regulation is the natural regimen for broadcasting..a Yet the number of daily newspapers is certainly not infinite 66 and, in light of the fact that there are now tlree times as many radio stations as tlere are newspapers, ttre relevance of this distinction is dubious. Consolidation is ttre established pattern of ttre American pres! today, and the need to develop means of access to the press is not diminished because the limitation on the number of newspapers is caused by economic rather than technological factors. Nor is tbe argument that ottrer newspapers @n always spring into existence persuasive-the ability of individuals to publish pamphlets should not preclude regulation of mass circulation, monopoly newspapers any more than the availability of sound trucks precludes regulation of broadcasting stations.
rf a contextual approach is taken and a purposive view of ttre first amendment adopted, at some point the newspaper must be viewed as impressed with a public service stamp and. hence under au obligation to provide space on a nondiscriminatory basis to representative groups in the community.Gs rt is to be hoped tlat an awareness of the listener's interest in broadcasting will lead to an equivalent concern for the reader's stake in the press, and that first amendment recognition rvill be given to a right of access for &e protection of ttre reader, the listener, and tle viewer.
V. Iupr-prwnNTrNc e Rrcgr or Accrss To rEE prsss . The foregoing analysis has suggested ttre necessity of rethinking first amendment theory so that it wiu uot only be effective in preventing governmental abridgment but will also produce "" See Relort on Editorializing by Broad,costing Licensees, r3 F.C.C, n46, tz57 (rg+o). A. Iudicial, Enlorcement one alternative is a judicial remedy affording iudividuals and groups desiring to voice views on public issues a right of nondiscriminatory access to the community newspaper. This right could be rooted most naturally in the letter-to-the-editor column 6? and the advertising section. That pressure to establish such'a right exists in our law is suggested by a number of cases in which plaintiffs have contended, albeit unsuccessfully, that in certain circumstances nelvspaper publishers have a common law duty to publish advertisements. In these cases the ad,vertiser sought nondiscriminatory access, subject to even-handed limitations imposed by rates and space.
Although in none of these cases did ttre newspaper publisher assert lack of space, ttre right of access has simply been denied.os The drift of the cases is that a uewspaper is not a public utility and ttrus has freedom of action regardless of the objectives of the daimant seeking access. one case has the distinction of being the only American case which has recognized a right of acc.ss. ln uhlman u. sherman's a\ ohio lower court held that the dependence and interest of the public in the community newspaper, particularly when it is the only one, imposes the reasonable demand that ttre purchase of advertising snould be open to members of the public on the same basis.
6" rn lvall v. world Publishing co., 263 p.zd roro (okla. 1953), a reader of the Tulsa World contended that the newspaper's invitation to its readers to submit letters on matters of public importance was a contract offer from the newspaper whi& was accepted by submission of tbe letter. The plaintifr argued th"i, by refusal to publish, the newspaper had breached its contract. Despite the ingenuity of the argument, the court held for defeudant. Note, hovever, that a first "..odment argument was not made to tie court. osShuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, zr5 fowa v76, 247 N.W. 8r3 (rSlf ); J.f. But none of these cases mentions first amendment considerations. wbat is encouraging for the future of an emergent right of access is that it has been resisted by relentless invocation of the freedom of contract notion tlat a newspaper publisher is as free as any merchant to deal with whom he chooses-?o But the broad holding of these commercial advertising cases need not be authoritative for political advertisement. rndeed, it has long been held that commercial advertising is not the t5pe of speech protected by the first amendment,?l and hence even an abandoument of the romantic view of the first amendment and adoption of a purposive approach would not entitle an individual to require publication of commercial material. rlowever, at tbe heart of tle first amendment is political speech. fn this area of speech, a revised, realistic view of t.he first amendment would permit the encouragement of expression by providing not only for its protection after publication but also for its emergence by publication. The constitutional interest in ((uninhibited,,, ,,robust,, debate, expressed anew in, Ti'mes, supplies new impetus for recoguition of a right of access for political and public issue advertising generally.
Nevertheless, courts in two fairly recent cilsres have refused to require tle publication of political advertisements. Tn Mid-west Erectric Caoperatiae,Inc. a.West Teras Chamber ol Commercerz arr electricai cooperative, a member of the chamber, had tendered an advertisement to be placed in the chamber's magazine. The chamber refused to publish tle advertisement because it was "contrary to the policies of the organization," but it offered to publish it if "any presentation of political or economic philosophy" contrary to the chamber's policies were omitted. The court refused to require publication, rejecting the cooperativets contention that, although the chamber had the right to choose what to print, the right was to be enforced by a rule of reasonableness. The candor of tle censorship requirement in Mi.d-west highlights an area where groups and individuals are at the mercy of censorsr utrchecked because of a romantic view of ttre first amendment. On ttre other hand, even if a realistic view of the first amendment had been adopted by the court, application of a contextual approach might not have dictated an enforcement of a right of access since the medium was not a newspaper, but a magazine, an<i the scope of its impact on the community was apparently not great. The second case, Lord a. lVinchester Star, Inc.,,s presented an even more compelling situation for recognition of a first amendment right of access. A Boston attorney, residing in winchester, trfassachusetts, took a position on a local matter ad.verse to that taken by the newspaper in town. Although the newspaper gave space to its side of the coutroversy, it refused to publish Mr. Lord's letter to ttre editor-hence debate in the only available local forum was effectively cut off. Lord petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandamus requiring the editor to publish his letter. The writ was denied and the supreme Judicial court of Massacbusetts affirmed. Lord appealed to the united states supreme court which dismissed for rvant of jurisdiction and, treating the appeal as a petition for certiorari, denied certiorari. Plaintiff was unable to provoke a single court to write an opinion, illustrating the lack of recognition given to the reader's interest in "freedom of the press." Although ttrese c:xes would augur ill for judicial creation of a constitutionally recognized right of access, it must be noted that the interdependence of free access and a free press was neither argued to the courts nor considered by them.
The courts could provide for a right of access other tran by reinterpreting the first amendment to provide for tle emergence as well as the protection of expression. A right of access to the pages of a monopoly newspaper might be predicated on Justice Douglas's open-ended t'public function" theory which carried. a majority of the court in Euans a. Newton?a Such a theory would, demand a rather rabid conception of "state action," but if parks in private hands cannot escape the stigma of abiding ,,public characterr" it would seem ttrat a newspaper, which is the common journal of printed communication in a community, could, not escape ttre constitutional restrictions which quasi-public status invites. rf monopoly newspapers are indeed quasi-public, tleir refusal of space to particular viewpoints is state action abridgiug expression in violation of even the romantic view of ttre first B. A Statutory Solution Another, and perhaps more appropriate, approach would be to secure the right of access by legislation. A statute might impose tle modest requirement, for example, ttrat denial of .access not be arbitrary but rattrer be based on rational grounds. Al&ough some cimes have involved a statutory duty to publish,?s a constitutional basis for a right of access has never been considered. Tn Clzronicle & Gazette Publi.shing Co. u. Attorney General,?' legislation limiting the rates for political advertising to the rates charged for commercial advertising was held constitutional by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. fn upholding the statute Justice Kenison stated: 78 ('ft is not necessary to consider ttre extent to which such regulation may go but so long as it does not involve suppression or censorship, the regulation of newspapers is as broad as ttrat over . . . private business.,t This decision is consistent witl a view of ttre first amendment which permits legislation to effectuate freedom of expression, although ttre court did not uphold ttre statute on a theory of constitutional power to equalize opportunities for expression. However, in a dissentiug opinion Chief Justice Marble pointed out ttrat the ('real purpose" of the statute was to provide for an '(economical means of [political] advertising,, rather than to counteract the dangers of bribery. Although dearly not put forth for this purpose,To Chief Justice Marble's intriguing analysis of the legislative intent is consistent with an access-oriented view of t}'e first amendment-limiting the amount that can be charged for political advertising provides equal opportunities of access for political candidates and views not buttressed by heavy financial support.
Justice Kenison, writing for the court in Chronicle, thought that the legislature's failure to compel some meixure of access to ttre press made it an easy case: s0 t'The present statute does not compel the plaintiff or any otJrer newspaper to accept political advertising." This remark at least leaves open ttre validity of a statute requiring access for political advertising. However, such a statute was given explicit judicial consideration in cornmonwealth a. Boston Transcri,pt Co.,r, where the elegant and now vanished Boston Eaening Transcript was charged with violation of a statute requiring newspapers to publish ttre findings of the state minimum wage commission. The court struck ttre statute down on a freedom of contract theory, the opinion bare of any mention of free expression problems. Although it was not until r9e5 that, Justice sanford observed for the uuited states supreme court that freedom of press was hidden in the underbrush of the fourteenth amendment,s2 failure to discuss freedom of the press in r9z4 is probably not pardonable since the supreme Judicial Court ignored a provision in the Massachusetts constitution prohibiting abridgment of freedom of the press. But tle Massac-husetts court in Boston Transcripf stopped short of suggesting tlat any statutory compulsion to publish was an invasion of freedom to contract. Rather, tle case dearly implies that some regulation in this area is permissible. But it did find one of the constitutional defects of the statute to be tle fact ttrat no legitimate state interest was served by the restriction on the publisher. The court was convinced tlat even witlout the statute the minimum wage board would "have ample opportunity to print its notice in ottrer newspapers tban tlat published by tbe defendant at the statutory price.,'83 This less pressing need for publication contrasts with the more compelling state interest in equalizing opportunities to rea& tle electorate presented in chronicle and the interest in access presented by the contemporary character of ttre mass media, illustrating the importance of a contextual approach.
Anottrer thread common to tle chronicle and, Boston Transcript cases was the concern of both courts with ttre increased risk of oug{ N.E. r48, rS2-S3,4S A.ed 478,48r (rS+6). Another important aspect of the case wrs the court's answer to the argument that regulatiou of potikcal advertising rates in the press, without corresponding regulation of other advertising facilities such as job printing aud billboard adverGing, was unconstitutioually discriminatory: 'Tt, is sufrcient aDsrver to this argument that the .state is not bound to cover the whole field of possible abuses.", IiI. at r5z, 4g A.zd at 4gr. 8r 249 Mass. 4?7r t44 N.E. 4oo (rge+). 82 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 6Sz (rSz5). 83e49 Mass. 47?,48$ r44 N.E. 4oo,4o2 (rSz+).
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EARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8o:164r whether tle right to access should be enforced. in a'particula^r case. rf all media in a community are held by the same ow:nership, ttre access claim has greater attractiveness. This is true although ttre various media, even when they do reach the same audience, serye different functions and. create different reactions and expectations. The existence of competition within the same medium, on the other hand, probably weakens tle access claim, ttrough co'npetition wittrin a medium is no assurance tlat significant opinions will have uo difficulty in securing access to newspaper space or broadcast time. rt is significant ttrat tle right of access cases that have been litigated almost invariably involve a monopoly newspaper in a community.tot
Vf. Corvcr,usror.r
The changing nature of the communications process has made it imperative that the law show concern for ttre public interest in effective utilization of media for the expression of diverse points of view. confrontation of ideas, a topic of eloquent affection in contemporary decisions, demands some recognition of a right to be heard as a constitutional principle. rt is the writer,s position ttrat it is open to the courts to fashion a remedy for a right of access, at least in the most arbitrary cases, independently of legislation. rf such an innovation is judically resisted, r suggest that our constitutional law authorizes a carefully framed right of access statute which would forbid an arbitrary denial of space, hence securing an effective forum for ttre expression of d.ivergent opinions.
with the development of private restraints on free expression, tle idea of a free marketplace where ideas can compete on their merits has become just as unrealistic in the twentieth century as the economic tleory of perfect competition. The worrd. in which an essentially rationalist philosophy of the first amendment was born has vanished and what was rationalism. is now romance.
'o' Ct, e.g., In ra Louis IVohI, [rc., 5o F.zd 254 (E.D. Mich. r93r).
